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Articles 
DO "CREATURES OF THE STATE" HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS?: STANDING FOR MUNICIPALITIES TO ASSERT 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE 
MICHAEL A. LAWRENCE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
WHEN it comes to constitutional rights vis-a.-vis their creating states, municipal corporations and other political subdivisions get little or 
no respect. It has been said, for example, that the nature of the relation-
ship between a municipal corporation and its creating state is such that 
the municipal corporation "cannot invoke the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment" and other constitutional provisions against the state. l 
The principle behind the limited power of municipalities is that "[b]eing 
but creatures of the State, municipal corporations have no standing to 
invoke the contract clause or the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution in opposition to the will of their creator."2 State 
court precedent supports this basic proposition, with most state courts uni-
formly denying municipal corporations any constitutional protection vis-a.-
vis their creating states.3 
This Article rejects the proposition that municipal corporations are 
completely lacking in constitutional rights vis-a.-vis their creating states. In-
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Michigan State University Detroit 
College of Law; J.D., M.S., University of Wisconsin Law School. The author would 
like to thank Professor Fred Cheever of the University of Denver College of Law 
for his helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the able research 
assistance of john Coronado. 
1. City of Newark v. New jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923). 
2. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939) (footnote omitted); see also 
City of Trenton v. New jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 189 (1923) (holding that just Com-
pensation Clause offers no bar to state's attempts to modify grant or charter it had 
previously given to city); City of Newark, 262 U.S. at 196 (stating that municipal 
corporation "cannot invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment" and 
other constitutional provisions against its own state); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 
207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (stating that municipality cannot assert Contract 
Clause as bar to state's efforts to alter municipality'S boundaries); E. B. Schulz, The 
nYfect of the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment upon the Power of the States to 
Control Municipal COrjJOrations, 36 MICH. L. REV. 385, 396-97 (1938) ("[TJhe con-
tract, due process, and equal protection clauses of the national Constitution afford 
no protection whatever to municipal corporations, in their own right, as against the 
power of the states to control them."). 
3. See 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.21 
Uohn H. Silvestri & Mark S. Nelson eds., 3d ed. 1999) ("Unless restricted by the 
state constitution, the state legislature has plenary power to create, alter, or abolish 
at pleasure any or all local government areas."). 
(93) 
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stead this Article argues that in this context these "creatures of the state" 
do, in fact, possess at least some constitutional rights. The proposition 
that a municipal corporation never has standing to invoke the protection 
of the Constitution against its own state is belied by the United States Su-
preme Court's suggestion in Gomillion v. Lightfoor that "[I]egislative con-
trol of municipalities, no less than any other state power, lies within the 
scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution."5 
With this statement, the Court implicitly recognized the possibility that a 
municipal corporation may indeed possess standing to assert that its creat-
ing state has exceeded constitutional limits while dealing with the munici-
pality. In addition, other state and federal cases bolster the proposition 
that states' power over their municipal corporations is limited in some re-
spects by the Constitution.1i 
This Article describes the current parameters of municipal corpora-
tion standing, particularly in view of the emergence of a more fully-devel-
oped procedural due process jurisprudence during the last decades of the 
twentieth century. Next, this Article provides a careful examination of fed-
eral and state precedent involving standing for municipal corporations to 
assert claims against their creating states, together with a review of the 
Court's current procedural due process doctrine. Finally, this Article con-
cludes that municipal corporations have standing to assert certain proce-
dural due process claims against the states that created them, even though 
they likely do not have standing to assert other claims, including those 
involving substantive matters of the state's internal political organization.7 
To the extent that the federal and state judiciaries have failed to draw an 
explicit distinction between procedural and substantive due process in this 
4. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
5. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344-45. 
6. See, e.g., Atl. Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freehold-
ers At!. County, 893 F. Supp. 301, 3Ir, (D.NJ. 1995) ("[M]unicipalities may assert 
claims against the creating state under the Supremacy Clause, but not under other 
substantive constitutional guarantees."); Shirk v. City of Lancaster, 169 A. 557, 560 
(Pa. 1933) ("[R]evenues derived in [a municipal corporation's] private capacity, as 
a return from its water or other utility works, are tmst funds, and cannot be con-
trolled or taken directly for state purposes."). 
From an early date, the United States Supreme Court "noticed" the distinc-
tion between property held by a municipal corporation in its governmental capac-
ity versus its private, proprietary capacity, and broached the possibility that there 
may be circumstances when the city might have a fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess claim against the state for the deprivation of property held in the latter capac-
ity. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 179-80. For a further discussion of limitations on state 
power, see infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
7. This Article asserts that municipal corporations have standing to assert pro-
cedural due process claims against their creating states for the deprivation of cer-
tain liberty and property interests that do not involve substantive matters of the 
state's internal political organization. The additional issue of the possibility of 
state sovereign immunity for such an action through the Eleventh Amendment 
and individual state constitutional provisions, while critical, is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
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context, principles of fundamental fairness and doctrinal consistency sug-
gest they should begin to do so.8 
Section II describes the contours of the state/municipal corporation 
relationship.9 Section III examines the limits of state supremacy by review-
ing the Supreme Court's procedural due process doctrine in the context 
of municipal corporation standing, and then by analyzing judicial prece-
dent concerning municipal corporation standing. lO Finally, Section IV 
briefly reiterates the assertion that Fourteenth Amendment procedural 
due process protections do indeed extend to municipalities in some 
circumstances. II 
8. For a discussion of why courts should draw a distinction between procedu-
ral and substantive due process, see infra note 58 and accompanying text. In the 
end, because so many aspects of state-local relations do involve "substantive matters 
of internal political organization," likely it will be the unusual case where the mu-
nicipality would be able to maintain standing under the theory espoused in this 
Article. Moreover, even accepting this Article's premise that municipalities have 
standing to assert procedural due process claims against their creating states in 
cases not involving substantive matters of the state's internal political organization, 
it may well be the case that the procedural due process requirements of notice and 
adequate hearing are sometimes met through the state's legislative process itself, 
thus defeating the municipality'S procedural due process claim. For a further dis-
cussion of the role of legislation in this issue, see infra notes 94-95 and accompany-
ing text. 
The importance of this Article's fundamental arguments is not diminished, 
however, despite the existence of these possibilities. Principles of fundamental 
fairness suggest that there must be some sort of recourse under the federal Consti-
tution for a municipality in a case (though rare) where the state inappropriately 
attempts to deprive the municipality of an interest having nothing whatsoever to 
do with substantive matters of the state's internal political organization. 
It is axiomatic that constitutional doctrine changes over time to accommodate 
our increased and evolving understanding of the Constitution, in all of its com-
plexity. One need only look so far as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause for an example supporting the proposition that our understanding of 
the Constitution is an evolutionary process: in 1896, the Court held that the gov-
ernment may segregate African Americans from Caucasians provided accommoda-
tions for both races were "equal but separate." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
540 (1896), overruled fry Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). The 
Court explicitly repudiated that viewpoint half a century later in Brown v. Board of 
Education. See id. at 494-95 (stating that "in the field of public education the doc-
trine of 'separate but equal' has no place" and that "[a]ny language in Plessy v. 
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected"); see also LAWYER'S WIT & WISDOM 95 
(Bruce Nash & Alan Zullo eds., 1995) (quoting Justice William Brennan, who 
stated that, "We current justices read the Constitution in the only way we can-as 
20th-century Americans"). 
9. For a discussion of the relationship between states and the municipalities 
they create, see infra notes 13-32 and accompanying text. 
1 O. For a discussion of case law concerning the standing of municipalities, see 
infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text. 
11. For the Article's conclusion, see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
Municipal corporations are creations of the State. 12 These corpora-
tions "are usually regarded (in legal theory at least) as subordinate depart-
ments, auxiliaries, or convenient instrumentalities of the state for the 
purpose of local or municipal rule."13 The municipal corporation has 
been variously described by state courts as "an arm of the state, a minia-
ture state, an instrumentality of the state, an agency of the state, and the 
like."14 
It is clear that, as creations of the sovereign, municipal corporations 
are subject to a great deal of control by their creating states. Indeed, 
Judge McQuillin posits that" [u] nless restricted by the state constitution, 
the state legislature has plenary power to create, alter, or abolish at plea-
sure any or all local governmental areas ... [and] may establish reasona-
ble preconditions to incorporation of local government units."15 
The scope and breadth of the state's power is illustrated by the con-
ventional wisdom regarding municipal corporation ownership of real 
property, which posits that the municipality's power "to purchase or other-
wise acquire real property can be questioned only by the state and the 
amount of real estate which a municipal corporation may hold is a ques-
tion only for the state."16 Implicit in this statement is the proposition that 
the state may affirmatively control the municipal corporation's interest in 
real estate. It is the state, for example, that possesses the power of eminent 
12. See 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 1.20 (discussing kinds of public local 
corporations). BLACK'S LAw DIGrIONARY defines "municipal corporation" as: "a 
city, town, or other local political entity formed by charter from the state and hav-
ing the autonomous authority to administer the state's local affairs." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1037 (7th ed. ]999). The preeminent treatise on municipal corpora-
tions describes the variety of municipal corporations: 
The areas in which [municipal and] public corporations ... operate may 
be urban, semi-urban, or rural. The urban or semi-urban areas usually 
embrace incorporated cities and towns, or municipal corporations 
proper, created for the purpose of local government. The rural areas, 
which are commonly quite extensive, generally take the name of county 
and township, and are chiefly administrative subdivisions of the state, al-
though they often serve as divisions or districts for other purposes. Unin-
corporated towns, villages, hamlets, or boroughs lie in counties or 
townships, where they are usually subject to county or township adminis-
tration. Another class of public local areas created [by the state] for par-
ticular purposes such as drainage, irrigation, reclamation, improvement, 
levee, benefit, taxing, etc., districts may also lie in whole or in part in 
other governmental areas. However, as these public quasi-corporations 
are created for special purposes and have an existence separate and apart 
from the areas in which they are situated, they are not, as organs of gov-
ernment, affected by the administration of the area in which they func-
tion, though they may be affected as a practical matter. 
1 MCQUILLIN, sujffa note 3, § 1.20 (footnotes omitted). 
13. fd. § 1.19 (footnote omitted). 
14. fri. § 2.08.10 (footnotes omitted). 
15. fri. § 1.21. 
16. 10 id. § 28.2] (footnotes omitted). 
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domain, "an inherent attribute of the sovereignty of the state to take or 
authorize the taking of any property within its jurisdiction," 17 regardless of 
the fact that the property may be "already devoted to a public use by a 
subdivision or agency of that state."18 The power of eminent domain is 
"unrestricted, and does not emanate from constitution or statute, but is 
merely limited thereby."19 Stated another way, "the power of eminent do-
main is older than the constitutions, it requires no constitutional recogni-
tion, it is not created or granted by constitution or statute, and is without 
restriction, except as the people have limited it."2o 
Of course the people have limited the states' power of eminent do-
main, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution, as well as through the constitutions of all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. 21 Indeed, a number of states have chosen to dele-
17. 11 id. § 32.02 (citing, for example, United States v. Certain Lands in Louis-
ville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), and Campbell v. Chase National Bank, 5 F. Supp. 
156 (S.D.N.V. 1933». 
18. A S. Klein, Annotation, Power of Eminent Domain as Between State and Subdi-
vision or Agency Thereof, or As Between Different Subdivisions or Agencies 17lemselves, 35 
AL.R.3d 1293 § 3 (1971) (citing People ex rei. Department of Public Works v. Los 
Angeles, 179 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558 (1960) (holding that all property, including that 
already devoted to public use, is held subject to right of state to take and use it for 
other public purposes); WeIch v. Denver, 349 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1960) (commenting 
that state has power to acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, lands of municipal 
corporation already devoted to public uses); Bridgie v. Koochiching County, 35 
N.W.2d 537 (Minn. 1948) (explaining that legislature has complete control over 
property of municipal corporation, which it may take from control of officers of 
city and turn over to other state officers under direct supervision and control of 
state». 
19. 11 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 32.02 (citing, for example, MississiPPi & 
Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878». Judge McQuillin explains that 
the case stands for the proposition that "[o]rganic provisions requiring just com-
pensation for property so taken are a mere limitation on the exercise of the right 
and whether the conditions have been observed, is a proper matter for judicial 
cognizance." Id. (footnotes omitted). 
20. Id. § 32.02 (citing, for example, Mesa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Im-
provement & Power District, 373 P.2d 722 (Ariz. 1962); Greater Hartford Bridge Author-
ity v. Russo, 188 A2d 874 (Conn. 1963); Forest Preserve District of Du Page County v. 
Brookwood Land Venture, 595 N.E.2d 136 (III. 1992); In re City of Rochester, 121 N.E. 
102 (N.Y. 1918); State v. Superior Court, 149 P. 652 (Wash. 1915». 
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]orshall private property be taken for pub-
Iic use, without just compensation."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (making Fifth 
Amendment applicable to states by providing that no state may deprive any person 
property without due process of law); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898) 
(holding that state law deprives common carrier of its property without due pro-
cess if law unreasonably establishes rates for transportation of persons or prop-
erty); Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) 
(finding that Illinois statute violated due process clause by allowing extension of 
public street through private rails without compensation); 1 MCQUILLIN, supra 
note 3, § 1.21 ("Due to the abuse of [the state's] power, often for partisan politics, 
most state organic laws contain restrictions of some sort, especially limitations re-
lating to counties, cities and towns."). Of state constitutions, Judge McQuillin 
writes: 
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gate greater authority to municipal corporations by granting them "home-
rule" status.22 The purpose of home-rule constitutional provisions is: 
[T]o eliminate to some extent the authority of the legislature 
over the municipality, and to bestow on the municipalities com-
ing under home rule full power of local self-government as to all 
subjects that are strictly of municipal concern, or germane to mu-
nicipal functioning, and not in conflict with the constitution or 
applicable general laws. . .. Depending upon applicable consti-
tutional provisions, a charter adopted under home rule may be-
come the organic law of the municipality and supersede all 
general state laws in conflict with it relating to purely municipal 
affairs. 23 
In contrast to the interpretation of state constitutional and statutory 
provisions, historically the judiciary has greatly circumscribed the protec-
tions available to municipal corporations under the United States Consti-
tution. This approach is reflected in Judge McQuillin's treatise: "The due 
process clause in the Constitution is of little importance so far as legislative 
control of municipal corporations is concerned," due to the notion that 
"[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created 
for exercising any governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to 
them and they may not assert the protection of the due process clause 
against action of the state government."24 
That said, a few, mostly state courts, have extended greater federal 
constitutional protections to municipal corporations under certain nar-
rowly defined circumstances.2fi One set of such circumstances involves ac-
Id. 
After the middle of the 19th century, state constitutions contained nu-
merous provisions, many in much detail, touching local government, 
both urban and rural. The constitutions of all states admitted into the 
union after that time dealt largely with this subject, and the m~jority of 
the states already in the union revised their constitutions, making provi-
sion, more or less elaborate, affecting local government. Many limita-
tions, expressed and implied, were contained in those constitutional 
provisions relating to the powers of the legislature, concerning interfer-
ence with local selt:government. 
22. See 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, §§ 3.21-3.23 (describing creation, purpose 
and varying types of home-rule charters). 
23. Id. § 3.21.10 (footnotes omitted). 
24. 2 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.20 (Den-
nisJensen & Gail A. O'Grady eds., 3d ed. 1996) (citing, as examples of cases that 
state that municipalities, as creatures and instruments of state, are without stand-
ing to attack constitutionality of statute on due process grounds, Yonkers Commis-
sion on Human Rights v. City of Yonkers, 654 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Meador v. 
Salem, 284 N.E.2d 266 (III. 1972); Mountlake Terrace v. Wilson, 549 P.2d 497 (Wash. 
1976); Associated Hospital Service v. City of Milwaukee, 109 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. 1961»; 
see City of Hamilton v. Fairfield Twp., 678 N.E.2d 599, 612 (Ohio 1996) (noting 
that due process clause does not apply to municipalities). 
25. See, e.g., Proprietors of Mt. Hope Cemetery v. City of Boston, 33 N.E. 695, 
695 (Mass. 1893) (involving power of state legislature to compel city to transfer 
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knowledging the distinction between property held by a municipal 
corporation in its governmental capacity and that held in its private or 
proprietary capacity.26 Courts have held, for example, that: 
As to the property it ... holds for its own private purposes, a city 
is to be regarded as a constituent in State government, and is 
entitled to the like protection in its property rights as any natural 
person who is also a constituent. The right of the State as re-
gards such property, is a right of regulation, and ... is not a right 
of appropriation.27 
Accordingly, some courts have concluded that: 
Property of the first class is to be regarded as "public" property, 
and hence not protected by the constitutional inhibition in ques-
tion, while property of the second class is as much "private" as 
property of an individual landowner, with the result that it may 
not be taken by another subdivision or agency of the state with-
out payment of just compensation.28 
This approach is epitomized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's direct 
statement in Madison Metropolitan Sewerage District v. Committee on Water Pol-
lution.29 In that case the court stated that, "the Fourteenth Amendment 
... applies only to property held by a municipality in its proprietary 
capacity."30 
It is against this backdrop that we might hypothesize whether a partic-
ular municipal corporation (City) enjoys any protection (aside from any 
cemetery property held by it to private corporation, and stating that "[the state's] 
legislative power of control [over its cities] is not universal and does not extend to 
property acquired by a city or town for special purposes, not deemed strictly and 
exclusively public and political, but in respect to whiCh a city or town is deemed 
rather to have a right of private ownership, of which it cannot be deprived against 
its will, save by the right of eminent domain, with payment of compensation"). By 
contrast, the Mt. Hope Cemetery court noted that the state may execute significant 
control in requiring the city to transfer public property-without compensation-
to some other agency of the state appointed to perform similar or other public 
purposes. See id. The United States Supreme Court extended similar protection to 
municipal corporations in City of Boston v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 309, 316 (1922), affg 
City of Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 130 N.E. 390 (Mass. 1921). The 
Court stated that the city's property rights in its street railway system were of a 
proprietary nature so that they could not be taken by the state for use by another 
state agency without first making reasonable compensation to the city. See id. (ex-
tending due process rights to city). 
26. See Mt. Hope Cemetery, 33 N.E. at 695 (distinguishing between city property 
held for "special purposes" and that held as public land). 
27. People ex rel. Bd. of Park Comm'rs v. Common Council, 28 Mich. 227, 240 
(1873). 
28. Annotation, Eminent Domain: Power~f One Governmental Unit or Agency to 
Take Property of Another Such Unit or Agency, 91 L. Ed. 221, 248 (1946). 
29. 50 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1951). 
30. Madison Metro., 50 N.W.2d at 436 (citing Town of Bell v. Bayfield County, 
239 N.w. 503 (Wis. 1931». 
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applicable state constitutional or statutory provisions, which vary widely) 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in the event that 
its creating state (State) seeks to acquire certain of City'S real property 
(Property). Property is acquired by City on the open market for private 
development purposes with funds raised by City from private investors, 
whereby City will develop the property into a shopping center. In its pro-
prietary capacity, City plans to engage the services of a private contractor 
to build the shopping center and to contract with a management company 
to manage the project. City has embarked upon this plan having seen the 
success that other cities have had in entering the market with proprietary, 
essentially private, enterprises. 
State decides that it needs Cit-y's Property for a state office building. 
It asserts that it need not compensate City or provide any sort of hearing 
because City is a "creation of the state," and State thereby "has plenary 
power to abolish at [its] pleasure" this particular property interest of 
City.31 For its part, City recognizes that State's power of eminent domain 
is broad, and that State may well succeed in acquiring Property, but City 
asserts that at the very least State must give City procedural due process 
and compensation because State is attempting to take a "property" interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The question is: Does State 
need to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and 
provide City with procedural due process? While conventional doctrine, 
as applied by most courts, might say "No," this Article answers with an 
emphatic "Yes." 
III. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS HAVE STANDING TO AsSERT FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIMS AGAINST 
THEIR CREATING STATES 
A. Constitutional Limits on a Statt~'s Power over Its Municipal Corporations 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the matter of the rela-
tionship between states and their municipalities in Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 32 
31. 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 1.21. For a discussion of how municipalities 
are subject to control by their creating states, see supra notes 12-30 and accompa-
nying text. 
32. In Gomillion, the Court considered the validity of an act of the Alabama 
legislature that redefined the City of Tuskegee's boundaries in such a way as to 
exclude the great majority of Mrican-Americans, while leaving unaffected the 
white constituency. See 364 U.S. at 340 (explaining claim of Tuskegee'S Mrican-
American residents to enjoin state from enforcing act). The constitutional provi-
sions at issue in Gomillion were the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the latter providing that the right to 
vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. 
XV, § 1. 
The Court in Gomillion held that the Fifteenth Amendment limits a state's 
right to re-draw the boundaries of a municipal corporation in such a way as to limit 
the right to vote. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345 (paraphrasing the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which forbids states from passing any law that deprives citizen of his 
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It stated that, "the Court has never acknowledged that the States have 
power to do as they will with municipal corporations regardless of the con-
sequences. Legislative control of municipalities, no less than any other 
state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the 
United States Constitution .... "33 The Court further held that: 
[A] correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter 
and kindred cases is not that the State has plenary power to ma-
nipulate in every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, 
the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that the 
State's authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of 
the Constitution considered in those cases.34 
Gomillion thus sets forth the important principle that there are constitu-
tional limits to the degree of control that may be asserted by a state over 
municipal corporations, through legislation or otherwise.35 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Gomillion in Rogers v: Brockette,36 elabo-
rated upon this point: "[W]e do not think [the cases] hold that a 
municipality never has standing to sue the state of which it is a creature."37 
Rather, the Fifth Circuit opined that "Hunter, Trenton, and allied cases are 
substantive holdings that the Constitution does not interfere in states' in-
ternal political organization. They are not decisions about a municipal-
ity's standing to sue its state."38 
vote because of his race); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 
621, 633 (1969) (allowing states to retain power to impose reasonable citizenship, 
age and residency ballot requirements, while prohibiting states under the equal 
protection clause from requiring that residents own or lease taxable property to 
vote in elections for school board). 
33. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344. 
34. Id. at 344-45. In other words, a court must undertake, on a case-by-case 
basis, an inquiry into whether a state's action is subject to a "relevant limitation [ ] 
imposed by the ... Constitution;" 0"[, by contrast, whether the state's action "is 
unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution" at issue. See id. 
(discussing that in some circumstances, Constitution restrains state's power). 
35. See id. (discussing limitations on state action). The last phrase of the ear-
lier quote from Gomillion, "through legislation or otherwise," raises a key point: 
Gomillion has been cited (overbroadly, this Article suggests) for the proposition 
that in those cases where a municipal corporation may in fact have standing to 
challenge an action of its creating state, the municipality is limited to challenging a 
state legislative action. Gomillion suggests otherwise, however: "Legislative control of 
municipalities, no less than any other state power, lies within the scope of relevant 
limitations imposed by the United States Constitution." Id. In other words,just as 
legislative control of municipalities must comply with the limitations set forth 
under the Constitution, the exercise of "other state power" over municipalities-
e.g., judicial or executive-must also comply. See id. at 344 (suggesting that all 
exercises of state power over municipalities must comply with federal 
Constitution) . 
36. 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979). 
37. Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1068. 
38. Id. at 1069. The issue in Rogers involved whether a local school district, 
which the court likened to a municipal corporation, had standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a state statute requiring certain school districts to participate in 
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The important point to be derived from Rogers, as it interprets Gomil-
lion, is the proposition that a municipality lacks standing to sue the State 
when the suit involves substantive matters of the State's authority to struc-
ture its own internal political organization.39 Extrapolating from this pro-
position, when the suit does not involve substantive matters of the State's 
internal political organization, municipal corporation standing is not nec-
essarily foreclosed. In other words, the Constitution may, at least poten-
tially, "interfere" in such state activities.40 
Rogers, when combined with Gomillion, which suggests that the Consti-
tution imposes some limitations on state control over municipal corpora-
tions, indicates that there are instances when a municipal corporation has 
standing to assert that the state has violated a constitutionally protected 
right.41 Seen in this light, a more precise reading of Gomillion is that 
"Hunter and kindred cases" stand for the more narrow proposition that 
"the State's authority [to determine substantive matters of internal politi-
a federal subsidized breakfast program. See id. at 1067 n.19, 1068 (establishing that 
local school district is analogous to municipality and then granting standing to 
school district) (citing Gomillian, 364 U.S. at 344). The school district objected to 
being required by the state to participate in the program, arguing that because the 
federal program itself did not require the participation of any state or school dis-
trict, the federal law should prevail under the Supremacy Clause; hence, the dis-
trict should be allowed to choose not to participate. See id. at 1060 (explaining 
school district's claim against state). The Fifth Circuit allowed the school district 
standing to pursue its claim. See id. at 1060-67 (analyzing reasons why school dis-
trict had standing for its claim against State of Texas); see also Comment, Municipal 
Corporation Standing to Sue the State: Rogers v. Brockette, 93 HARV. L. REv. 586, 592 
(1980) (asserting that the Hunter line of cases "establish no more than that the 
particular constitutional guarantees in question confer no rights upon a municipal 
corporation that can be invoked against the state"). 
Similarly, in San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. 
Cal. 1978), affd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), the federal district court held that 
a local port district, which is analogous to a municipal corporation because it is a 
creation of the state, had standing to challenge the constitutionality of state legisla-
tion imposing a curfew on aircraft flights, where federal law had no such rule. See 
id. at 290 (stating that "[p]olitical subdivisions can be profoundly affected by state 
actions which conflict with federal law"). The court stated that "[t]he Supremacy 
Clause does not confer a 'right' on any individual, but it does compose a general 
limitation on state power." /d. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit declared that "[w]hile 
there are broad dicta that a political subdivision may never sue its maker on consti-
tutional grounds, ... we doubt that the rule is so broad" as to prevent the school 
district from bringing suit. Gianturco, 651 F.2d at 1309-10 n.7 (citation omitted). 
39. See Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1069 (citing substantive principle that "Constitution 
does not interfere in states' internal political organization"). 
40. See id. at 1070 (indicating that merits of case determine whether or not 
Constitution may "interfere" in state activities). 
41. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344 (stating that state does not have "plenary 
power to manipulate in every conceivable way for every conceivable purpose); Rog-
ers, 588 F.2d at 1070 (defining criteria associated with inquiries into standing as 
"the extent of an actual injury and of a genuine case or controversy," and deter-
mining that application of this criteria provides school district, likened to munici-
pal corporation, standing to sue state). 
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cal organization] is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Con-
stitution considered in those cases."42 
This proposition is supported by the Court's early statement in Hunter 
itself: 
It will be obsen'ed that in describing the absolute power of the 
State over the property of municipal corporations we have not 
extended it beyond the property held and used for governmental 
purposes. Such corporations are sometimes authorized to hold 
and do hold property for the same purposes that property is held 
by private corporations or individuals . . .. [I] t has been held 
that as· to the latter class of property the legislature is not 
omnipotent.43 
In the ninety-plus years since Hunter, the careful distinction the Court 
drew between property held by a municipal corporation in its governmen-
tal capacity and that held in its private, proprietary capacity has become 
blurred, along with the attendant possibility the Court implied that the 
city might have a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the 
State for the deprivation of property held in the city's private and proprie-
tary capacity.44 This failure is not due to the Court's basic re-thinking of 
the principle in the years since Hunter, but rather is due to the fact that the 
issue has never since reached the Court in such precise terms as it did in 
42. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344. Despite the possibility offered by such a read-
ing of broadly extending due process rights to municipal corporations, this Article 
does not attempt to do so. There are serious concerns with perpetuating a revival 
of this doctrine for individuals, much less for municipal corporations. Instead, the 
Article firmly asserts that when the subject of the suit involves not substantive mat-
ters, but rather the procedure by which the state has deprived the municipality of a 
liberty, property or other interest conferred by the state, Congress or the Constitu-
tion (at least insofar as the interest does not involve matters of the state's internal 
political organization), the municipal corporation does have standing to sue the 
state on procedural due process grounds. 
43. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). 
44. The Court stated in Hunter. 
If the distinction [between property held by a municipal corporation in 
its governmental versus private, proprietary capacity] is recognized it sug-
gests the question whether property of a municipal corporation owned in 
its private and proprietary capacity may be taken from it against its will 
and without compensation .... [T]he question has never arisen directly 
for adjudication in this court. But it and the distinction upon which it is 
based has several times been noticed [by the Court]. 
Id. at 179-80 (citations omitted). The City of Allegheny failed to argue at trial that 
it held the property at issue in a private and proprietary capacity. See id. at 180 
(noting that such argument did not appear in record and did not appear to be 
supported by facts). Therefore, the court did not directly address the constitution-
ality of a state taking municipal land held in a private capacity. See id. (stating that 
issue presented to court was "entirely different" from question of taking of pri-
vately-held municipal lands) . Implicit in Hunter, however, is the possibility that the 
court might have considered Allegheny's claim that it had been deprived of prop-
erty without due process of law, had it been able to accurately allege that the prop-
erty deprived was held by the city in its private and proprietary capacity. 
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Hunter, and the lower federal courts for their part have never adequately 
considered the question.45 
For example, the Sixth Circuit in South Macomb Disposal Authority v. 
Township of Washington,46 stated in dicta that "a municipal corporation, in 
its own right, receives no protection from the Equal Protection or Due 
Process Clauses vis-a-vis its creating state."47 This Article submits that for 
two reasons South Macomb overgeneralizes the issue. First, South Macomb 
fails to distinguish between substantive due process and procedural due 
process. Second, this case fails to distinguish between matters involving a 
state's internal political organization and those which do not, such as 
property held by the municipality in its private and proprietary capacity. 
While it appears that municipal corporations lack standing to chal-
lenge state activities involving substantive matters of internal political or-
ganization, the question of whether a municipality has standing to pursue 
procedural claims not involving matters of internal political organization is 
not clear.48 Neither the Supreme Court nor any other federal court has 
45. See, e.g., S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 
500,501 (6th Cir. 1986) (considering question of whether political subdivisions of 
states can challenge constitutionality of another political subdivision's ordinance 
on due process and equal protection grounds). 
46. 790 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1986). 
47. S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 505. South Macomb involved a lawsuit against a 
township by a municipal corporation whose purpose was to dispose of solid waste, 
alleging that the conditions the township imposed for a soil removal permit vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment. &e id. at 501 (considering municipal corpora-
tion's argument that conditions were not requirements under zoning ordinance 
and were imposed out of animosity, and that no other "similarly situated land-
owner" was required to meet such conditions). Stating that "a political subdivision 
of a state cannot challenge the constitutionality of another political subdivision's 
ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds" for the same reasons as a 
political subdivision receives no protection vis-a-vis its creating state, the court held 
that the municipal corporation lacked standing to pursue its lawsuit. See id. at 505 
(discussing court's reasoning for its holding). The court cites numerous cases and 
a 1938 Michigan Law Review article in support of its holding. See id. at 505 (quoting 
E. B. Schulz, The 1<-Yfect of the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment uj)on the 
Power of the States to Contml Municipal Corporations, 36 MICH. L. REV. 385, 396-97 
(1938) (asserting that "the contract, due process, and equal protection clauses of 
the national Constitution afford no protection whatever to municipal corpora-
tions, in their own right, as against the power of the states to control them")). 
South Macomb distinguishes Rogers, Gianturco and Gomillion by stating that 
"[t]here may be occasions in which a political subdivision is not prevented, by 
virtue of its status as a subdivision of the state, from challenging the constitutional-
ity of state legislation," but that the political subdivision categorically may not in-
voke the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 504. As discussed 
above, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text, Gomillion does not support this 
distinction. 
48. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960) ("The respondents 
invoke generalities expressing the State's unrestricted power-unlimited, that is by 
the United States Constitution-to establish, destroy or reorganize by contraction 
or expansion its political subdivisions, to wit, cities, counties, and other local units. 
We freely reorganize the breadth and importance of this aspect of the State's polit-
ical power."); see also Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1979) 
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fully addressed the distinction between procedural and substantive due 
process in this context.49 As the Supreme Court cautions: 
Particularly in dealing with claims under broad provisions of the 
Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive process of 
inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, 
based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to 
them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant 
con trolling facts. 50 
An examination of the cases cited by South Macomb in support of its 
broad conclusion that a municipal corporation receives no protection vis-a-
vis its creating state from the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses 
demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit indeed has overgeneralized the rule 
concerning municipal corporation standing. 51 Specifically, in South Ma-
comb the court failed to distinguish between substantive due process and 
procedural due process as it related to municipal corporation standing to 
challenge matters not affecting the state's internal political organization. 52 
(citing "decisions [that] are frequently said to establish that a municipality has no 
standing to sue the state that created it"). 
49. The early Hunter case is as close as the Supreme Court has come to dis-
cussing the possibility of procedural due process rights for a municipal corpora-
tion in the face of a state's acting to deprive it of property the city holds "in its 
private and proprietary capacity," but the Court did not reach the issue. See 
Hunter, 207 U.S. at 180 (stating that "[t]he question has never arisen directly for 
adjudication in this court"). 
50. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 343-44. 
51. See S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 505 (citing cases in support of its propositions). 
The court conceded that "[t]here may be occasions in which a political subdivision 
is not prevented, by virtue of its status as a subdivision of the state, from challeng-
ing the constitutionality of state legislation," but concludes that, otherwise, "a mu-
nicipal corporation, in its own right, receives no protection from the Equal 
Protection or Due Process Clauses vis-a-vis its creating state." [d. The South Macomb 
court cited the following cases: City of South Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 449 U.S. 1039, 1041-42 (1980) (White, j., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 
1057 (5th Cir. 1979); San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 
(S.D. Cal. 1978). S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 504-05. Again, this Article suggests that 
the South Macomb court mistakenly limits its comment to legislation. 
52. See S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 505 (stating that "a municipal corporation in its 
own right, receives no protection from the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause 
vis-a-vis its creating state"). All of the cases cited by the court deal fundamentally 
with the state's power to control the substance of the state's internal political or-
ganization and power vis-a-vis the municipal corporation. See id. at 504-05 (citing 
City of S. Tahoe, 449 U.S. at 1041-42 (White, j., dissenting); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 
342-47; Rogers, 588 F.2d 1057; Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283). Whether the procedure 
by the state in undertaking its action meets constitutional muster either is not at 
issue, or is not addressed, by the courts in these cases. See id. at 504 (describing 
issue as "actually quite narrow: whether a political subdivision of a state receives 
any protection from the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment vis-a-vis another political subdivision of the same state"). 
Many decisions denying municipal corporations standing involve substantive 
matters, and therefore do not affect the standing of municipalities to challenge the 
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B. Procedural Due Process Analysis 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no 
State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .... "53 For procedural due process claims, the Due Process 
constitutionality of state procedures. In City of Moore v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Ji'e 
Railway Co., 699 F.2d 507, 511-12 (10th Cir. 1983), for example, the Tenth Circuit 
denied the City of Moore standing to challenge the State of Oklahoma's authority 
to exempt certain companies from the city's zoning power-i.e., a matter that in-
volves the substance of the state's internal political organization and power with 
respect to the city. See id. 511-12 (holding that "political subdivisions ofa state lack 
standing to challenge the validity of a state statute on Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds"). 
Similarly, in Delta Special School District No.5 v. State Board of Education, 745 F.2d 
532 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eighth Circuit denied standing to a school district to chal-
lenge the State of Arkansas' authority to develop an administrative appeal process 
for student school transfers within a school district-a matter which, though "pro-
cedural" in the sense that it involves a state's development of a process for student 
appeals within a school district, nonetheless goes to the substance of the state's 
internal political organization and power with respect to the municipal corpora-
tion. See id. at 533 (upholding district court's ruling that political subdivisions of 
state cannot invoke protection of Fourteenth Amendment against state). Likewise, 
the Fifth Circuit, in Appling County v. MunicijJal Electric Authority of Georgia, 621 F.2d 
1301 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), held that a county lacked standing to challenge 
the state of Georgia's authority to confer tax exemptions on certain companies to 
the relative advantage of certain, but not all, counties-i.e., a substantive matter 
involving the state's internal political organization. See id. at 1308 (quoting Wil-
liams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 (1933). The Wil-
liams Court stated that, "[a] municipal corporation ... has no privileges or 
immunities under the federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition of 
the will of its creator." 289 U.S. at 40, 53. 
The Second Circuit weighed in on the matter in City of New York v. Richardson, 
473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973), holding that New York City could not challenge the 
State of New York's social security financing and reimbursement policies as they 
applied to the City. See id. at 929 (citing Williams). That same year, the Second 
Circuit denied the City of New York standing to challenge the State of New York's 
authority to require AFDC recipients, only in certain municipalities and districts, 
to register for training and employment-i.e., substantive matters of internal politi-
cal organization. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1101 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(discussing city's lack of standing to assert constitutional claims against its state). 
Finally, in the Seventh Circuit, the District Court for the Northern District of Indi-
ana held that Lake County lacked standing to challenge Indiana's legislative 
scheme to distribute federal AFDC funds among counties-i.e., once again, a sub-
stantive matter subject to state discretion. See County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of 
Lake County v. Stanton, 545 F. Supp. 239, 242-43 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (concluding 
that "municipal corporations have repeatedly been denied the right to challenge 
state legislation allegedly violative of the federal Constitution") (quoting City of 
Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1976». 
Again, the point to be gleaned from all of these cases is that they ultimately 
involve matters concerning the state's authority to structure the substance of the 
state's relationship with the municipal corporation-i.e., its authority to set the 
substantive parameters of its own "internal political organization." None explicitly 
involve the adequacy of the procedure used to deprive a municipal corporation of a 
particular property or liberty interest not involving matters of internal political 
organization. 
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Clause involves a two-step analytical inquiry. First, has the State in some 
way deprived a "person" of "life," "liberty" or "property" interests within 
the meaning of the Due Process Clause?54 Second (assuming the first 
question has been answered in the affirmative), what sort of "process" is 
"due"?55 
The Supreme Court discussed the importance of the distinction be-
tween substantive and procedural due process in Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. Loudermill;">6 
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides 
that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-can-
not be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate 
procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are dis-
tinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a 
mere tautology .... The right to due process "is conferred, not 
by [the state's] legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. 
While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest 
... , it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such 
an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural 
safeguards. "57 
In other words, once it can be said that a person-whether that person is 
an individual citizen, a private corporation, or a municipal corporation-
possesses a protectable life, liberty, or property interest, the state no 
longer has the discretion to determine the minimum process by which 
that interest may be deprived.58 Rather, the Constitution determines the 
minimum process that will be due.59 The Court has stated that at a mini-
mum, "the fundamental [constitutional] requirement of due process is 
the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.' "60 
54. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (pro-
viding clear holding on Due Process Clause substantive rights). 
55. See id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
56. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
57. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 54l. 
58. For discussion ofa municipal corporation's status as a "person" under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text. For discus-
sion of what constitutes a "property interest" for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, see infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
59. See Loudermil~ 470 U.S. at 541 ("[O]nce it is determined that the Due 
Process Clause applies, 'the question remains what process is due.' The answer to 
that question is not to be found in the [state] statute.") (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. at 481). 
60. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). It follows from Mathews that in order to have a 
"meaningful" hearing in a "meaningful manner," it is first necessary to have ade-
quate "notice" of the hearing. 
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1. A Municipal Corporation Is a "Person" For Purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
Most of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the procedural 
due process inquiry involves whether the government has deprived an indi-
vidual or a private corporation of a liberty or property interest.61 Whether a 
municipal corporation, by contrast, qualifies for such protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment has not been squarely addressed by the Supreme 
Court, and for their part the lower federal courts have failed to explore 
fully the nuances of procedural due process doctrine as it may apply to 
municipal corporations.62 
To proceed to an analysis of whether a municipality in a particular 
case has been denied procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is necessary to ask the preliminary threshold question 
whether a municipality is a "person" for purposes of the Due Process 
Clause. It is well-settled that "[a] private corporation is clearly a 'person' 
within the meaning of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses," but 
from a very early date the Supreme Court has questioned whether a public 
corporation is entitled to the same protections as a private corporation.63 
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,64 Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained that a state's power to regulate a private corporation is limited by 
the Constitution, whereas the Constitution does not act as a bar for the 
state's regulation of its own public corporations, even though the two cor-
porations may provide identical services.65 
61. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (stating that 
African-American petitioners alleged that Alabama act redefining city boundaries 
violated Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of Fourteenth Amendment); 
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (stating that 
petitioners, residents of school district, alleged that state's requirement that they 
own or lease taxable property to vote in election for school board violated their 
rights under Constitution's Equal Protection Clause). 
The nature of the interests at stake in these cases vary. They may be real 
property, as in takings cases, or life/liberty/property interests created by, and/or 
guaranteed by, statutory entitlement or by the Constitution. See, e.g., Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that welfare recipient's interest in contin-
ued receipt of welfare benet1ts was "statutory entitlement" that amounted to "prop-
erty" within meaning of Due Process Clause). 
62. See, e.g., Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1999) (cit-
ing Supreme Court and lower court cases addressing municipality's standing to sue 
state) . For a further discussion of lower court cases, see supra note 38 and accom-
panying text. 
63. S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 503 
(6th Cir. 1986) (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936)) (em-
phasis added). 
64. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
65. See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 589, n.(c) (distinguishing be-
tween legislature's power regarding private corporations and its power regarding 
public corporation). Dartmouth College involved a successful Contract Clause chal-
lenge to a New Hampshire law that changed Dartmouth College from a private to 
a public institution. See id. at 666 (finding law changing charter to be unconstitu-
tional). Dartmouth College is a pre-Civil War case, of course, and the Fourteenth 
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That said, lower federal courts have acknowledged that under certain 
circumstances municipal corporations may be considered "persons" under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Township of River Vale v. Town of Orange-
town,66 the Second Circuit treated a New Jersey township as a person 
under the Due Process Clause when it held that the township had standing 
to assert a claim against a town in the neighboring state of New York for 
damages caused to the township by that town's zoning change.67 When a 
case involves a claim by a municipal corporation against another state or 
one of the other state's local units, as was the case in Township of River Vale, 
it is unquestioned that "the broad supremacy doctrine [of states over their 
local governments] is not apposite."68 
This Article submits that "the broad supremacy doctrine"69 of states 
over their local governments is similarly "not apposite" with regard to the 
Amendment had not yet been created and ratified. Together with the other "Civil 
War Amendments" (the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), the Fourteenth 
Amendment marked a "fundamental realignment of federal and state power," 
whereby "[i]nstead of viewing the Constitution as a protection from federal power 
and the states as a bulwark against federal interference, at least some people came 
to see constitutional rights as a basis for the assertion of federal power to protect 
individuals against state interference." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 495-96,506 (3d ed. 1996). Notions of states being required to afford persons 
due process-both substantive and procedural-were decades in the future at the 
time Dartmouth College was decided in 1819. Nonetheless, Dartmouth College stands 
as precedent to the extent that a state's power to regulate private corporations is 
limited by the Constitution, whereas the Constitution does not act as a bar for the 
state's substantive regulation of its own internal political organization (including 
the "organization" of municipal corporations). See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) at 561 (discussing various sorts of corporations and varying levels of con-
trol state exercises over them). 
66. 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968). 
67. See River Vale, 403 F.2d at 686 (1968) (holding that municipal corporation 
is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection). 
68. JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 52 (2d rev. ed. 1986). 
While cases supporting this proposition suggest the existence of limits on a state's 
power over its municipal corporations, they cannot be cited as direct authority in 
support of municipal corporation standing because most of these cases involve 
individual citizens bringing suit to allege deprivations of their own individual liber-
ties. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) (stating the "legis-
lative control of municipalities, no less than any other state power, lies within the 
scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution"); Kramer 
v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (prohibiting states under 
Equal Protection Clause from requiring residents to lease or own taxable property 
to vote in school board elections). 
69. FORDHAM, supra note 68, at 52; see City of Newark v. New jersey, 262 U.S. 
192,196 (1923) ("The enforcement by the State of the provision of the act impos-
ing upon the City the specified annual payments for such diversion of water does 
not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The regu-
lation of municipalities is a matter peculiarly within the domain of the state."). A 
fundamental proposition of the "state supremacy" principle is that a "State may 
withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges [from a public corporation] as 
it sees fit." City of Trenton v. New jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923). 
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local governments' procedural due process claims.70 Using our hypotheti-
cal as an example, where City acquires certain Property on the open mar-
ket for private development purposes with funds raised from private 
investors, City has acquired and holds Property in a manner that is totally 
independent of its relationship with State.71 In this instance, City essen-
tially has taken on the characteristics of an individual "person" who would 
otherwise be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were it not a mu-
nicipal corporation. There is no principled reason not to extend constitu-
tional procedural due process protections to City when State attempts to 
take Property for its own use, thereby depriving City of its proprietary 
property interest. 
Most states and their legislatures have given effect to this assertion, at 
least implicitly, through the enactment of various constitutional and statu-
tory provisions; and a number of state courts have likewise given effect to 
the proposition by requiring that states compensate cities for the taking of 
certain types of proprietary property from cities.72 Moreover, at least one 
state court has recognized the very principle proposed in this Article-
namely, that municipal governments should have standing to assert proce-
dural due process claims against their creating states.73 In a 1994 case, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals stated in dicta that, "[i]n contrast [to a ban on 
asserting substantive due process claims], municipal corporations are not 
barred from asserting procedural due process claims."74 
70. It is this Article's position that a state certainly may "withhold, grant or 
withdraw [some] powers and privileges" from a municipal corporation as it sees fit, 
but when a state attempts to withdraw interests having nothing to do with substan-
tive matters of the state's internal political organization, the state must comply with 
procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Trenton, 262 
U.S. at 187. 
71. For the establishment of the hypothetical, see supra note 31 and accompa-
nying text. 
72. For a discussion of self-imposed limits on states' power to interfere with 
local government, see supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
73. See City of Colorado Springs v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the County of Eagle, 
895 P.2d 1105, 1119 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (distinguishing between substantive and 
procedural due process claims by municipalities). Colorado Springs involved cities 
in Colorado that applied to the Board of County Commissioners for a special use 
permit to conduct a major extension of an existing water collection system and a 
permit to conduct a municipal water project, pursuant to the Land Use Act and 
other land use regulations. See id. at 1109 (referring to City of Aurora and City of 
Colorado Springs as "the cities"). The Board denied the permits, and the cities 
filed an action in protest. See id. (noting that "the cities" filed C.R.C.P. 106 action 
protesting denial). The trial court ultimately "ordered the Board to approve the 
permits because it found that the Board had violated due process by improperly 
refusing to consider a final wetlands mitigation report submitted to the Army 
Corps of Engineers." [d. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed on this point, 
concluding that the "County regulations [were] within the authority granted in 
connection with the administration of activities of state interest and [were] not 
violative of any constitutional provisions. Thus, the decision of the Board [was] 
reinstated." See id. at 1120 (citing Ross v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 713 P.2d 
1304 (Colo. 1986)). 
74. [d. at 1119. 
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Stating the proposition another way, once it can be said that the mu-
nicipal corporation has acquired a protectable property or liberty interest 
(at least to the extent the interest does not affect matters involving the 
state's internal political organization), any effort by the State to deprive 
the municipality of that interest will trigger procedural due process protec-
tions. As the Supreme Court has explained, "The right to due process 'is 
conferred, not by [the state's] 'legislative grace, but by constitutional 
guarantee.' "75 
2. Municipal Corporations Can Have "Property Interests" Under the Fourteenth 
A mendment Due Process Clause 
To assert a procedural due process claim, a person must successfully 
argue the deprivation by the state of a "life, liberty, or property" interest.76 
This Article focuses on the "property" aspect of the Due Process Clause, 
since property-especially real property-is the more tangible and certain 
of the "liberty" and "property" interests.77 It is undisputed that real prop-
erty is "property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and that 
any deprivation by the state of a person's real property may be done only 
after the state has afforded the person notice and an adequate hearing.7s 
75. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (explaining 
due process rights). 
77. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 7.3.4 (1997) (noting that term "life," even if it were relevant in context of munici-
pal corporation standing, "in the due process clause is rarely the subject of 
controversy") . 
78. See id. § 7.3 (noting lack of controversy caused by term "property" in Four-
teenth Amendment). It can also be argued that certain other rights and responsi-
bilities granted to municipal corporations through state legislation are also in the 
nature of "property" interests, in the same way that statutory entitlements for indi-
viduals have been held to be property for purposes of the Due Process Clause. See 
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972) (explaining that property inter-
ests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement 
to those benefits"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that indi-
viduals receiving welfare benefits have a "property interest" in continuing to re-
ceive those benefits, and that government must provide due process if it seeks to 
withdraw those benefits); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 783-
87 (1964) (arguing that government entitlements constitute a form of "new prop-
erty" to which procedural due process protections should extend). 
Given limiting statements by the Supreme Court on the matter of what consti-
tutes liberty and property for purposes of due process analysis and the ideological 
leanings of the current Court, it seems unlikely that the Court would accept an 
argument that a state's legislative grant to a municipal government of Home Rule 
powers, for example, constitutes a "property" interest, the deprivation of which 
must comply with procedural due process requirements. Cf Bishop v. Wood, 426 
U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (holding that employee's discharge was not deprivation of 
property interest protected by Fourteenth Amendment). Nonetheless, this Article 
asserts that procedural due process rights for municipalities should extend at least 
to those indisputable property interests having nothing to do with substantive mat-
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Municipal corporati9ns often own real property. As previously dis-
cussed, a distinction can be made between property held by the municipal 
corporation in its governmental capacity as compared to that held in its 
private, proprietary capacity.79 Some courts hold that: 
[P] roperty of the first class is to be regarded as "public" property, 
and hence not protected by the constitutional inhibition in ques-
tion, while property of the second class is as much "private" as 
property of an individual landowner, with the result that it may 
not be taken by another subdivision or agency of the state with-
out payment of just compensation.so 
In other words, under this approach "the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies only to property held by a municipality in its proprietary capac-
ity."Sl Accordingly, it must be so that a Fourteenth Amendment "property 
interest" does indeed exist, and the state may deprive the municipality of 
this interest only upon affording it: due process of law. 
3. What Sort of ''Process'' Is Due? 
Under procedural due process analysis, once it is determined that the 
state is attempting to deprive a "person" of a "life, liberty, or property" 
interest, the Constitution requires, at a minimum, that the person have 
the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner."S2 In conducting its inquiry, a court should consider three 
factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
ters involving the state's internal political organization, with the full understanding 
that most disputes between states and their municipalities probably do turn on 
"substantive matters of internal political organization," and are therefore beyond 
constitutional protection. For a discussion of a municipality's standing to sue, see 
infra note 95 and accompanying text. Moreover, adequate process may well al-
ready be afforded through the legislative process, as discussed infra notes 92-94 
and accompanying text. 
79. For a discussion of the legal distinction between publicly-held and pri-
vately-held municipal property, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
80. Annotation, supra note 28, at 248 (indicating when state courts have given 
protection to municipalities); see also supra note 42 (noting that this Article sup-
ports premise that only when state has procedurally deprived municipality of lib-
erty, property or other interest does municipality have standing to sue on 
procedural grounds). 
81. Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Comm. on Water Pollution, 50 N.W.2d 
424,436 (Wis. 1951). For support for the proposition that state interest with pro-
prietary nature must be reasonably compensated before it can be used by another 
state agency, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
82. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965». For a discussion of what minimum due process 
is due under Fourteenth Amendment for property interest, see supra notes 59-60 
and accompanying text. 
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through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entai1.83 
113 
In a case such as that posed in our hypothetical, where State seeks to 
acquire real Property held by City in its private and proprietary capacity, 
State should be expected to provide process similar to that which would be 
afforded an individual person holding property that the government seeks 
to acquire. In other words, courts should apply the three-factor Mathews v. 
Eldridg/H test in determining whether the State's "process" passes constitu-
tional muster: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entai1.85 
In our hypothetical, City'S "private" interest to hold and use Property 
is a fundamental property right and weighs heavily in the Mathews balanc-
ing test.86 At the very least, if City has expended funds of its own to ac-
quire and develop Property to any significant extent, State's action can 
have grave economic consequences for City. The risk of "erroneous depri-
vation" of City's property interest is great if the State is under no obliga-
tion to accord basic due process of law to the City any time State decides 
that it wants City's property.87 Principles of fundamental fairness should 
discourage states from trying to get "something for nothing"-even from 
those noxious "creatures of the state."88 In addition, the "probable value" 
of requiring State to observe basic principles of due process in a case 
where it seeks to deprive City of property held in City'S private and propri-
etary capacity is that such a requirement would give effect to the Supreme 
Court's statement that" [1] egislative control of municipalities, no less than 
any other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed 
by the United States Constitution."89 The Court further stated that, "[t]he 
83. Id. at 335. 
84. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
85. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335 (articulating three-part test). 
86. See id. at 335-39 (weighing private interest at risk). 
87. [d. at 335 (noting that degree of potential deprivation must be considered 
in assessing validity of administration's decision-making process). 
88. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (stating that, 
regardless of granted power, municipality remains "creature of the state"). 
89. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960). For a discussion of 
the facts and resolution of Gomillion, see supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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State [does not have] plenary power to manipulate in every conceivable 
way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal corpora-
tions .... "90 Moreover, long-recognized distinctions between property 
held by municipal corporations in their governmental capacity and that 
held in their private and proprietary capacity would be reemphasized by 
an insistence on observing procedural due process in such circum-
stancesYI Finally, requiring the State to accord procedural due process to 
City might lead to marginally greater administrative and other costs for 
StateY:? In the final analysis of the hypothetical, factors one and two of the 
Mathews balancing test far outweigh factor three, leading to the natural 
conclusion that the current process of denying municipal corporations 
procedural due process protections from certain actions of their creating 
states is unconstitutional. In sum, under Mathews, State must provide City 
adequate procedural due process if it seeks to deprive City of property 
held in City's private and proprietary capacity. 
It should be observed that, lest an objection is raised that allowing 
municipal corporations standing to pursue procedural due process claims 
against their creating states would open the floodgates of litigation, in 
many cases a strong argument can be made that the municipality already 
receives the required procedural due process through the normallegisla-
tive process.93 Specifically, the legislative process involves the opportunity 
for debate among state legislators, some of whom represent the district 
encompassing the municipal corporation. Under this argument, the inter-
ests of the municipality, therefore, are arguably adequately represented by 
the political process, and the municipality in effect receives the necessary 
"hearing" required under the Due Process Clause.94 
90. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344. 
91. For a discussion of a municipality's standing to sue on due process 
grounds, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
92. Cf Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (noting that financial cost alone is not "con-
trolling factor" in determining whether due process is met, but that court must 
weigh government's interest). Additional costs for State would be payment of just 
compensation to municipal corporations for the Property State takes from City. 
To the extent that state statutory and constitutional provisions already require pay-
ment of just compensation, the act of imposing federal procedural due process re-
quirements does not in fact increase State's cost. 
93. The balance would be tipped too far in favor of the municipality, the ar-
gument goes, if a municipality can assert that the state has deprived it of its right to 
procedural due process any time the state legislature decides to withdraw, change, 
or withhold a municipality's liberty or property interest. This is far from the case, 
though, in our hypothetical case where State attempts to take Property held by City 
in its private and proprietary capacity. 
94. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 
(1915) (stating that "[g]eneral statutes within the state power are passed that affect 
the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giv-
ing them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that 
they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those 
who make the rule."). 
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Indeed, the legislative-process-as-adequate-hearing argument, when 
combined with the state's authority to determine matters involving the 
substance of its internal political organization free of constitutional con-
straint95 (and because the great majority of actions affecting municipal 
corporations probably involve such matters), leads one to suppose that it 
still may be the unusual case where the municipal corporation would be 
able to argue successfully that its procedural due process rights have been 
violated. Despite the fact that the end result likely would be the same 
whether or not the municipality has standing-namely, the municipality 
fails in its effort to overturn the state's action-the means used in coming 
to that result are altogether different, and the distinction is of prime im-
portance in terms of the principles of doctrinal consistency and funda-
mental fairness. 
In one case-where the municipal corporation does have standing to 
bring the procedural due process claim-the municipality is properly rec-
ognized as a "person" able to assert certain procedural due process rights, 
but which simply has not prevailed on the merits of procedural due pro-
cess analysis. This is a far cry from the alternative case-where the munici-
pal corporation has no standing-whereby the municipal corporation is 
summarily denied any opportunity for judicial review regardless of the na-
ture or grievousness of the state's action. Again, the distinction in the 
means used here make all the difference in whether the principles of jus-
tice underlying the Due Process Clause are (or are not) being vindicated. 
For purposes of doctrinal consistency, then, the approach advocated 
in this Article-namely, that a municipality does have standing to pursue a 
procedural due process claim when the creating state seeks to deprive the 
municipality of a liberty or property interest not involving substantive mat-
ters of the state's internal political organization-is the preferred ap-
proach. This approach is also more in keeping with the notion that "[t]he 
essence of procedural due process is fundamental fairness."96 Specifically, 
notwithstanding the existence of state constitutional or statutory provi-
sions,97 it is important to the health and efficiency of state-local govern-
ment relations that the Due Process Clause require states to observe at 
least minimal procedural requirements vis-a.-vis their municipal cOrpora-
95. See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, lO64 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
United States Constitution does not limit state's ability to abolish or reorganize 
political subdivision). 
96. City and County of Denver v. Eggert, 647 P.2d 216, 224 (1982); see also 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (stating that "the right to be heard before being con-
demned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the 
stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society") 
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) 
(Frankfurther, j., concurring»; id. (stating that" [t] he fundamental requirement 
of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner'") (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965». 
97. For a discussion of state constitutional and statutory provisions, see supra 
note 21 and accompanying text. 
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tions. To accept less would sanction any impairment by a State of a munic-
ipal corporation's interests so long as it was cloaked in the garb of the line 
of cases cited in South MacombYs As asserted by the Supreme Court in a 
different context, "It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the 
Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of 
existence. "99 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Conventional wisdom holds that "a municipal corporation, in its own 
right, receives no protection from the Equal Protection or Due Process 
Clauses vis-a-vis its creating state," LOO due to the municipality's historical 
status as "a [mere] agency of the state."lOI This Article argues, after a care-
ful examination of federal and state precedent involving standing for mu-
nicipal corporations to assert claims against their creating states, together 
with a review of the United States Supreme Court's current procedural 
due process doctrine, that such statements are overbroad, and that munic-
ipal corporations do in fact have standing to assert procedural due process 
claims against their creating states in cases not involving substantive mat-
ters of the state's internal political organization. Judicial recognition of 
this distinction would go a long way toward furthering principles of funda-
mental fairness and doctrinal consistency in state-local relations, and to-
ward according a measure of deserved respect to those constitutionally-
maligned "creatures of the state," municipal corporations. 
98. See S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 
504 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that relationship between public corporation and its 
creating state has led court to conclude that municipal corporations cannot invoke 
Fourteenth Amendment protection). 
99. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (quoting Frost v. Frost 
Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926». 
100. S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 505. For a further discussion of the South Macomb 
case, see supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
10l. 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 2.08. 
